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Secrecy transmission is investigated for a cooperative jamming scheme, where a multi-antenna jam-
mer generates artificial noise (AN) to confuse eavesdroppers. Two kinds of eavesdroppers are considered:
passive eavesdroppers who only overhear the legitimate information, and active eavesdroppers who not
only overhear the legitimate information but also jam the legitimate signal. Existing works only treat
the passive and active eavesdroppers separately. Different from the existing works, we investigate the
achievable secrecy rate in presence of both active and passive eavesdroppers. For the considered system
model, we assume that the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the active eavesdroppers
is available at the jammer, while only partial CSI of the passive eavesdroppers is available at the
jammer. A new zero-forcing beamforming scheme is proposed in the presence of both active and passive
eavesdroppers. For both the perfect and imperfect CSI cases, the total transmission power allocation
between the information and AN signals is optimized to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. Numerical
results show that imperfect CSI between the jammer and the legitimate receiver will do more harm to
the achievable secrecy rate than imperfect CSI between the jammer and the active eavesdropper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) techniques have attracted tremendous research attention in the
past decade. Different from the conventional encryption methods, PLS can achieve positive
secrecy rate without a predetermined secrecy key [1]. Many approaches have been proposed to
enhance the secrecy performance of PLS. For example, multiple antennas and relay techniques
are often deployed to enhance the reception performance at the legitimate receiver. On the other
hand, artificial noise (AN) and cooperative jamming can be deployed to degrade the reception
performance at the eavesdropper. When there is a high secrecy rate requirement or when the
eavesdropper channel quality is better than the legitimate channel quality, AN and cooperative
jamming become attractive schemes to secure transmission [2]–[4].
A plethora of works have investigated beamforming with AN under different secrecy goals
and different transmission scenarios. For instance, when transmit beamforming is deployed at
the multi-antenna transmitter, the achievable secrecy rate [5], [6], the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) [7], and the secrecy throughput [8], [9] can be improved by optimizing the power allocation
between the information signal and AN. Under both secrecy and transmission outage constraints,
an on-off AN scheme was investigated to maximize the effective secrecy throughput in [10],
[11], where fully adaptive AN schemes, i.e, adaptive transmission rate and adaptive secrecy rate,
were proposed. By contrast, a partial adaptive AN scheme was proposed in [12] for a fixed
secrecy rate and a varying transmission rate. The results in [12] indicate that the partial adaptive
scheme outperforms the on-off scheme, and can achieve almost the same secrecy performance
as the fully adaptive scheme. In addition, when a normal user and a secure user 1 coexist
in a cellular network [13], under the constraint of average throughput for the normal user,
the effective secrecy throughputs for the non-adaptive and fully adaptive AN schemes were
maximized by the optimal power allocation among the secure user, AN, and the normal user.
In addition, due to feedback overhead [14], time-varying channels [15] and imperfect channel
state information (CSI) estimation [5], [7], AN towards the eavesdroppers can be leaked to the
legitimate receiver. Moreover, for the case of imperfect CSI, optimal power allocation between
1A normal user transmits public messages without a secrecy requirement, and a secure user transmits privacy messages with
a secrecy constraint.
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3the legitimate information signal and AN was also studied in [5], [7] for high reliability and
security transmission.
When multiple antennas are not available at the transmitter and the AN technique cannot be
used, a friendly jammer can be employed to degrade the eavesdropper channel. Without the
eavesdroppers’ instantaneous CSI, a joint jamming and beamforming design was considered
in [16], [17], where the jammer equipped with beamforming injects AN into the null space
of the legitimate receiver. Similarly, multiple single antenna jammers can cooperatively form
the transmit beamforming and inject AN towards the eavesdroppers [18], [19]. These works
assumed that transmit beamforming was applied at a multi-antenna jammer or multiple single-
antenna jammers. Different from these works, a new jamming scheme was proposed without
transmit beamforming in [20], while multiple jammers cooperatively transmit the noise towards
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers. Moreover, to reduce the system complexity, one
‘best’ jammer that has the minimum noise power at the legitimate receiver was selected to
forward the AN under both perfect and imperfect CSI assumptions [21].
The aforementioned works assumed that the eavesdroppers’ instantaneous CSIs were unavail-
able at the legitimate transmitter and the jammer. These eavesdroppers can be considered as the
passive eavesdroppers, who overhear legitimate messages silently. However, besides the passive
eavesdropper, recently several works have considered the active eavesdropper who can transmit
malicious jamming signals and receive legitimate signals simultaneously [22]–[26]. Similarly,
when multiple antennas were deployed at the active eavesdropper and legitimate receiver, the
power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems were solved in [27], [28]. In
addition, to circumvent the imperfect CSI issues, robust techniques were introduced in [29]–
[31], where cooperative jamming schemes were designed based on the worst-case secrecy rate.
In practice, the eavesdroppers can cooperate to overhear the legitimate information. For exam-
ple, in a wireless network, active eavesdroppers may intentionally expose themselves to attract the
legitimate user’s attention by injecting AN. Simultaneously, passive eavesdroppers overhear the
legitimate information silently. Considering the active eavesdroppers or the passive eavesdroppers
alone cannot achieve the maximum secrecy rate [32], [33] and the secure performance cannot
be guaranteed. Hence, for the legitimate user, it is necessary to design the secrecy transmission
scheme considering both the active eavesdropper and passive eavesdropper. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, there is no prior work focusing on secrecy rate maximization when both
active and passive eavesdroppers coexist in a wireless network. Hence, we propose a cooperative
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4jamming scheme to achieve high reliability and security transmission for a wireless network
having coexisting active and passive eavesdroppers. Both the instantaneous CSI of the active
eavesdropper link and the partial CSI of the passive eavesdroppers links are exploited to improve
the secrecy performance. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1. For the scenario when the active and passive eavesdroppers coexist in a wireless network, we
propose a cooperative two-fold zero-forcing jamming scheme for secrecy transmission. In
the proposed scheme, a multi-antenna jammer treats the active and passive eavesdroppers
differently. Specifically, maximal ratio transmission (MRT) is used as the beamforming
vector towards the active eavesdropper, and the AN for the active eavesdropper lies in the
null space of the legitimate receiver. By contrast, a random beamforming vector is used for
the passive eavesdropper, and the AN for the passive eavesdroppers lies in the null space
of both the legitimate receiver and the active eavesdroppers. Since both the instantaneous
CSI of the active eavesdropper link and partial CSI of the passive eavesdropper links are
exploited, the proposed jamming scheme can significantly improve the secrecy rate over the
conventional beamforming with AN schemes that only take the passive eavesdroppers into
account, and inject AN equally towards all directions.
2. Under both the transmission reliability and security constraints, the total transmission power
is allocated among the legitimate information signal, AN for the active eavesdropper, and
AN for the passive eavesdroppers to maximize the secrecy rate. The legitimate information
power is first derived after we reveal a monotonicity relationship in transmission outage
probability and SOP. Then, we prove the monotonicity of SOP with the AN power allocated
to the active eavesdropper, concavity of SOP with the AN power allocated to the passive
eavesdroppers, and the monotonicity of SOP with the secrecy rate. Based on these properties,
the secrecy rate is maximized by optimally allocating the remaining power to AN for the
active eavesdropper and AN for the passive eavesdroppers, respectively.
3. In practice, the instantaneous CSI can be imperfect due to feedback delay or estimation
error. To investigate the impact of imperfect CSI on secrecy performance, we derive exact
expressions for the transmission outage probability and SOP under imperfect CSI. Using
these expressions, we study the relationship between the power allocation ratio and SOP,
and obtain the maximum secrecy rate as well as optimal design parameters. We reveal that
imperfect CSI between the jammer and Bob always reduces the achieved maximum secrecy
rate. By contrast, the imperfect CSI of the jammer to the active eavesdropper link does not
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5affect the achieved maximum secrecy rate when the channel quality between the jammer
and the active eavesdropper is high.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model
and presents a cooperative jamming scheme for secrecy transmission. Section III formulates an
optimization problem to maximize the secrecy rate, and proposes a numerical method to solve
the optimization problem. In Section IV, optimizing the transmit power allocation between the
information signal and AN is investigated with imperfect CSI. In Section V, the cooperative
jamming scheme is proposed when there are multiple active eavesdroppers in the network.
Numerical results are presented and discussed in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VII.
Notations- (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H denote the transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose, re-
spectively; ‖·‖ denotes the Frobenius norm. fυ (·) is the probability density function (PDF) of
random variable (RV) υ; Fυ (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of RV υ; φυ (s) is
the moment generation function (MGF) of υ; E(·) is the expected value of a RV; Gamma(µ, σ2)
denotes the gamma distribution with shape parameter µ and scale parameter σ2; exp(σ2) denotes
the exponential distribution with mean σ2. χ2 (ν) denotes the central chi-square distribution with
ν degrees of freedom; Cm×n denotes the set of m× n complex matrices; x ∼ CN (Λ,∆)
denotes the circular symmetric complex Gaussian vector with mean vector Λ and covariance
matrix ∆.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
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Fig. 1. System model of secure communication systems with both the active and passive eavesdroppers
We consider the wireless network shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter (Alice) aims to
establish a secure communication link with the legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of an
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6active eavesdropper Ea and K passive eavesdroppers Ek (1 ≤ k ≤ K), who attempt to overhear
the legitimate information transmitted from Alice. The active eavesdropper equipped with two
antennas operates in a full-duplex mode, where it transmits the AN towards the legitimate receiver
and overhears the legitimate messages simultaneously. By contrast, the passive eavesdroppers
overhear the legitimate messages silently. Moreover, to improve the secrecy performance, Alice
deploys a friendly jammer J equipped with N antennas to confuse both the active and passive
eavesdroppers. Due to the space and cost limitations, Alice, Bob and the passive eavesdroppers
are each equipped with a single antenna, which is a reasonable assumption in device-to-device
(D2D) networks.
All channels are assumed to experience Rayleigh flat fading. The instantaneous CSI of the
Alice → Bob, Alice → Ea, Alice → Ek, and Ea → Bob links are, respectively, denoted by
the channel coefficients hA,B, hA,Ea , hA,Ek , and fEa,B, which are complex Gaussian RVs having
mean zero and variances σ2A,B, σ
2
A,Ea
, σ2A,Ek , and σ
2
Ea,B
, respectively. In addition, gB ∈ CN×1 ∼
CN (0, σ2J,BIN), gEa ∈ CN×1 ∼ CN (0, σ2J,EaIN), and gEk ∈ CN×1 ∼ CN (0, σ2J,EkIN) denote
the instantaneous CSI of the jammer → Bob, the jammer → Ea, and the jammer → Ek links,
respectively. We assume that the instantaneous CSI of gEa , and the statistical CSI of gEk are
available at Alice and the jammer, which is a reasonable assumption since the active eavesdropper
injects AN towards Bob, while the passive eavesdroppers overhear the message silently.
III. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION FOR SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
There are two main schemes for secrecy rate maximization, namely, adaptive schemes and non-
adaptive schemes [13], [34]. Though an adaptive scheme can make full use of the wireless channel
and improve the secrecy capacity, it increases the receiver complexity due to frequent change
in the secrecy code rate. Moreover, since an adaptive scheme requires continuous change of the
transmit power and thus has a higher complexity, we adopt a more practical and low-complexity
non-adaptive scheme where the transmission rate Rb and secrecy rate Rs are fixed during the
transmission. For the non-adaptive scheme, it is challenging to jointly optimize the beamforming
coefficients and power allocation under a secrecy outage constraint. We will therefore first design
a suboptimal beamforming scheme in the presence of both passive and active eavesdroppers.
Then, based on the proposed beamforming scheme, we investigate the optimal power allocation
between the legitimate signal, the AN for the active eavesdropper and the AN for the passive
eavesdroppers.
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7A. A Two-fold Zero-forcing Beamforming Scheme
In the presence of both active and passive eavesdroppers, we propose a two-fold zero-forcing
beamforming applied at the multi-antenna jammer J . More specifically, the AN injected towards
the active eavesdropper will not interfere with Bob. In addition, the AN injected towards the
passive eavesdropper will not interfere with Bob, as well as the active eavesdropper, because
a separate AN signal has already been injected towards it based on instantaneous CSI between
Jammer and the active eavesdropper. The proposed scheme makes a full use of the instantaneous
CSI of the jammer → Bob and the jammer → Ea links. Specifically, the jammer adopts MRT
to maximize the AN power at the active eavesdropper. Thus, the beamforming vector for the
active eavesdropper WEa ∈ CN×1 should lie in the null-space of gB, and it is given by
WEa =
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
g∗Ea∥∥∥(IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2 )g∗Ea∥∥∥ . (1)
At the same time, since there are multiple passive eavesdroppers, the beamforming matrix for
the passive eavesdroppers, WEp ∈ CN×(N−2), must be designed to enhance secrecy performance.
On the one hand, to avoid interfering with Bob, WEp should also lie in the null space of gB.
On the other hand, since we have precisely injected AN to the active eavesdropper by MRT,
beamforming for the passive eavesdroppers should remove the dimension corresponding to the
active eavesdropper. Hence, WEp should lie in the null-space of [gB,WEa ]. Moreover, since
the instantaneous CSI of the jammer → Ek link is unavailable, the AN power for the passive
eavesdroppers, PJP , is uniformly allocated to N − 2 dimensions [35]. Thus the transmitted AN
vector nJ ∈ CN×1 is given by
nJ =
√
PJAWEanJA +
√
PJP
N − 2WEpnJp (2)
where PJA denotes the AN power for the active eavesdropper. In addition, nJA ∼ CN (0, 1) and
nJp ∈ C(N−2)×1 ∼ CN (0, IN−2) denote the injected AN for the active eavesdropper and the
passive eavesdroppers, respectively. Then, the received signals at the active eavesdropper Ea and
the passive eavesdropper Ek are, respectively, given by
yEa =
√
PAhA,Eax+
√
PJAg
H
EaWEanJA + nEa (3)
and
yEk =
√
PAhA,Ekx+
√
PJAg
H
Ek
WEanJA
+
√
PJP
N − 2g
H
Ek
WEpnJp + nEk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K (4)
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8where PA is the transmit power at Alice. In addition, nEa ∼ CN (0, 1) and nEk ∼ CN (0, 1),
respectively, denote the noises at the active eavesdropper Ea and the passive eavesdropper Ek.
Since all the eavesdroppers cooperatively overhear the legitimate information, the interference
generated by Ea is assumed to be perfectly cancelled at Ek and Ea by using advanced analog
and digital interference cancellation methods [36], [37];
Now, we derive the CDFs of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the active eavesdropper, denoted
as γEa and the passive eavesdroppers, denoted as γEk (1 ≤ k ≤ K). Assume that the interference
generated by the jammer dominates the noise power at the active eavesdropper, i.e., σ2J,Ea  1.
Thus, according to (3), γEa can be written as
γEa =
PA|hA,Ea |2
PJA
∣∣gHEaWEa∣∣2
=
PAσ
2
A,Eaλ1/2
PJAσ
2
J,Ea (N − 1)λ2/(2(N − 1))
(5)
where |hA,Ea|2 ∼ Gamma (1, σ2A,Ea); λ1, |
hA,Ea|2
σ2A,Ea/2
∼ χ2(2); λ2 , |g
H
Ea
WEa|2
σ2J,Ea/2
∼ χ2(2(N − 1)).
Thus, the ratio λ1/2
λ2/(2(N−1)) follows an F -distribution having degrees of freedom (2, 2(N − 1)),
which is denoted by F(2,2(N−1)), and the CDF of γEa is given by
FγEa (x) = 1−
(
PAσ
2
A,Ea
PAσ2A,Ea + PJAσ
2
J,Eax
)N−1
. (6)
Similarly, according to (4), the SNR at the k-th passive eavesdropper Ek is expressed as
γEk =
PA|hA,Ek |2
PJA
∣∣gHEkWEa∣∣2 + PJpN−2gHEkWEpWHEpgEk . (7)
Since |hA,Ek |2 ∼ exp (σ2A,Ek), λ3 ,
∣∣gHEkWEa∣∣2 ∼ Gamma (1, σ2J,Ek), and
λ4 , gHEkWEpWHEpgEk ∼ Gamma (N − 2, σ2J,Ek), the CDF of the passive eavesdropper Ek
is given by
FγEk (x) = 1− Pr
(
PA|hA,Ek |2
PJAλ3 +
PJpλ4
N−2
≥ x
)
(a)
=1− E
(
exp
(
− PJAxλ3
PAσ2A,Ek
))
× E
(
exp
(
− PJpxλ4
(N − 2)PAσ2A,Ek
))
(b)
=1−
(
1 +
PJAxσ
2
J,Ek
PAσ2A,Ek
)−1
×
(
1 +
PJpxσ
2
J,Ek
(N − 2)PAσ2A,Ek
)2−N
(8)
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9where step (a) follows from the MGF of |hA,Ek |2, and step (b) follows from the MGF of λ3 and
λ4 [38]. In addition, the received signal at Bob is expressed as
yB =
√
PAhA,Bx+
√
PEafEa,Bna + nB (9)
where x is the information symbol having unit power. na ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the AN transmitted
from Ea, and PEa denotes the transmission power at the active eavesdropper. In addition, nB
denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob having mean zero and variance
N0 = 1. Assume that the interference power at the legitimate receiver is much greater than the
noise power, i.e., an interference-limited environment for the legitimate receiver. Then, according
to (9), the SNR at Bob is expressed as
γB =
PA|hA,B|2
PEa |hEa,B|2
. (10)
Since |hA,B|2 ∼ Gamma (1, σ2A,B), the CDF of γB is given by
FγB (x) = 1−
1
PEaσ
2
Ea,B
(
1
PEaσ
2
Ea,B
+
x
PAσ2A,B
)−1
. (11)
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
For the cooperative jamming scheme, both the transmission and secrecy quality should be
satisfied. To guarantee the transmission quality, the transmission outage probability requirements
should be less than a predetermined threshold δ. Simultaneously, to guarantee the secrecy
transmission, the SOPs for both the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers should
be less than a predetermined threshold ε. Thus, to maximize the secrecy rate Rs under reliability
and security transmission requirements, we formulate the optimization problem as follows
max
PA,PJA ,PJp
Rs (12a)
s.t. pto ≤ δ, (12b)
pso1 ≤ ε, pso2 ≤ ε, (12c)
PA + PJA + PJp ≤ Pmax, (12d)
0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb (12e)
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where (12b) and (12c) denote the reliable transmission constraint and secrecy transmission
constraint, respectively. In addition, eq. (12d) is the total power constraint. pto is the transmission
outage probability and it is given by
pto = Pr (log2 (1 + γB) < Rb)
= 1− 1
PEaσ
2
Ea,B
(
1
PEaσ
2
Ea,B
+
2Rb − 1
PAσ2A,B
)−1
. (13)
Let PJp = (1− θ) (Pmax − PA) and PJA = θ (Pmax − PA) where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Then, according to
(6), the SOP for the active eavesdropper Ea, is expressed as
pso1 = Pr (log2 (1 + γEa) ≥ Rb −Rs)
= (1 + θα)1−N (14)
where α =
(
Pmax
PA
− 1
)
σ2J,Ea(2
Rb−Rs−1)
σ2A,Ea
is greater than zero since Pmax
PA
≤ 1 and 2Rb−Rs − 1 ≥ 0. In
addition, since it is challenging for the passive eavesdroppers to acquire the perfect instantaneous
CSIs of the jammer → Ek links, the eavesdropper that has the maximum SNR overhears
the legitimate message at each time slot. Then, according to (8), the SOP for the passive
eavesdroppers is given by
pso2 = Pr
(
max
1≤k≤K
(log2 (1 + γEk)) ≥ Rb −Rs
)
= 1−
(
1− 1
1 + βθ
(
1 +
β (1− θ)
(N − 2)
)2−N)K
(15)
where β =
(
Pmax
PA
− 1
) (2Rb−Rs−1)σ2J,Ek
σ2A,Ek
. Since ∂pso1
∂PA
> 0 and ∂pso2
∂PA
> 0, both pso1 and pso2 increase
with PA. Also, since
∂pso1
∂Rs
> 0 and ∂pso2
∂Rs
> 0, both pso1 and pso2 increase with Rs.
C. Parameter Optimization for Secrecy Rate Maximization
It can be shown that both pso1 and pso2 are monotonous increasing functions with PA and Rs.
Thus, to maximize Rs, we should first derive the minimum required PA. According to (12b) and
(13), the minimum power allocated to Alice is given by
P ∗A =
1− 2Rb
ln (1− δ)σ2A,B . (16)
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It is clear that if P ∗A > Pmax, there is no solution to (12a). After determining the optimal power
P ∗A, we can rewrite the optimization problem in (12a) as
max
θ
Rs
s.t. pso1 ≤ ε, pso2 ≤ ε,
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb. (17)
In (17), the first-order derivative of pso1 with respect to (w.r.t.) θ is given by
∂pso1
∂θ
= (1−N)α(1 + θα)−N . (18)
Obviously 1 − N ≤ 0 and ∂pso1
∂θ
< 0. This means that there is a monotonous relationship
between pso1 and θ, i.e., pso1 decreases with θ. Then, according to the SOP requirement at the
active eavesdropper, θ should satisfy the following constraint
ψ (PA, Rs) ≤ θ ≤ 1 (19)
where ψ (PA, Rs) = α−1
(
ε
1
1−N − 1
)
. Note that if ψ (PA, Rs) > 1, there is no solution to (12a).
In addition, the first-order derivative of pso2 w.r.t. θ is derived as
∂pso2
∂θ
= K
[
1− 1
1 + βθ
(
1 +
β (1− θ)
N − 2
)2−N]K−1
×
(
β
1 + βθ
)2(
1 +
β (1− θ)
N − 2
)1−N (
Nθ − θ − 1
N − 2
)
. (20)
It can be shown that ∂pso2
∂θ
< 0 when 0 ≤ θ < 1
N−1 ,
∂pso2
∂θ
= 0 when θ = 1
N−1 , and
∂pso2
∂θ
> 0
when 1
N−1 < θ ≤ 1. Thus, for a fixed secrecy rate Rs and a fixed transmission power PA, pso2 is
a convex function of θ, and pso2 is minimized when θ =
1
N−1 . Assume ϕ (PA, Rs) is the inverse
function of pso2 . Since pso2 is a convex function of θ, there are two θ values satisfying pso2 = ε,
namely, the smaller value min (ϕ (PA, Rs)) and the larger value max (ϕ (PA, Rs)). When ε is
large, min (ϕ (PA, Rs)) can be less than zero and max (ϕ (PA, Rs)) can be larger than unity.
However, θ has been defined as the ratio of PJA to Pmax − PA and has a range between zero
and unity. Thus, to satisfy pso2 ≤ ε, θ is given by
max (0,min (ϕ (PA, Rs))) < θ < min (1,max (ϕ (PA, Rs))) . (21)
Note that if pso2 > ε when θ =
1
N−1 , Eq. (21) is satisfied and there is no solution to (12a).
February 19, 2020 DRAFT
12
According to (16), (19), and (21), the maximum secrecy rate can be obtained by Algorithm
1. In this algorithm, ∆ denotes the incremental step for Rs, and it can be determined by the
required Rs accuracy. In addition, we have the following remarks regarding Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secrecy Rate Rs Maximization
1: Initialization: N,K, ε, Pmax, Rs ∈ [0, Rb).
2: According to (16), the optimal power allocated to Alice P ∗A can be obtained.
3: Set i = 1, Rs = 0,
4: Calculate the constraint (19) and (21)
if ψ (P ∗A, Rs) < min (1,max (ϕ (P
∗
A, Rs))), Rs = Rs + ∆,
else break;
5: i = i+ 1, repeat step 4 until ψ (P ∗A, Rs) ≥ min (1,max (ϕ (P ∗A, Rs), )),
or there is no solution for the constraints in (17).
6: Then θ∗ = ψ (P ∗A, Rs), the maximum secrecy rate R
∗
s = Rs.
Remark 1: For the proposed scheme having a fixed total transmit power, the maximum secrecy
rate Rs decreases with Rb, because large Rb requires more power to be allocated at Alice and
the remaining power for the AN is decreased.
Remark 2: Under the secrecy outage constraint, the AN power for the active eavesdropper is
inversely proportional to the channel quality between the jammer and the active eavesdropper,
and is inversely proportional to the number of transmit antennas. For the extreme case when the
active eavesdropper is close to the jammer or the number of transmit antennas N approaches
infinity, the AN power for the active eavesdropper goes to zero.
Remark 3: Under the secrecy outage constraint, there is no monotonous relationship between
the AN power for the passive eavesdroppers and σ2J,Ek . Specifically, when the passive eavesdrop-
per is close to the jammer, θ∗ approaches unity. It is noted that the optimal θ∗ corresponding to
the maximum secrecy rate is equal to 1/(N − 1), which also corresponds to the minimum value
of SOP for the passive eavesdroppers. This means that the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers
dominates the maximum secrecy rate and the SOP for the active eavesdropper is negligible.
In addition, since pso1 is a monotonous function of both Rs and θ, Algorithm 1 stops when
θ = 1 cannot satisfy the pso1 constraint. By contrast, since pso2 is a convex function of θ,
Algorithm 1 stops only when there is no solution for θ that satisfies SOP constraints.
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IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION WITH IMPERFECT CSI
In our proposed jamming scheme, the beamforming vector depends on the CSI of the jammer
to Bob and the active eavesdropper links. However, it is challenging to acquire the perfect CSI
due to feedback delay or estimation error. Therefore, we will investigate the impact of imperfect
gB and imperfect gEa on the maximum secrecy rate in the following subsections.
A. Imperfect CSI Between Jammer and Bob
Assume that the instantaneous CSI gB cannot be perfectly estimated at the jammer, and
g˜B ∼ CN
(
0, σ2J,BIN
)
denotes the imperfect CSI between the jammer and Bob. The relationship
between gB and g˜B is expressed as [39]
gB = ρBg˜B + eB, 0 ≤ ρB ≤ 1 (22)
where eB ∼ CN
(
0, (1− ρ2B)σ2J,BIN
)
denotes the estimation error for gB, and ρB is the
correlation coefficient between gB and g˜B. Since g˜B only determines the null-space of WEa and
WEp , it will not affect the SNR at both the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers,
which have the same expressions as (5) and (7), respectively. However due to imperfect CSI g˜B,
the AN generated to interfere with the eavesdroppers will leak to Bob, and the SNR at Bob is
modified to
γ˜B =
PA|hA,B|2
PJA
∣∣∣W˜HEaeB∣∣∣2 + PJpN−2∥∥∥W˜HEpeB∥∥∥2 (23)
where
∣∣∣W˜HEaeB∣∣∣2 follows an exponential distribution having parameter (1− ρ2B)σ2J,B. The ratio
2
∥∥∥W˜HEpeB∥∥∥
(1−ρ2B)σ2J,B follows a chi-square distribution having n degrees of freedom χ
2(2(N − 2)).
Thus, PJA
∣∣∣W˜HEaeB∣∣∣2 + PJpN−2∥∥∥W˜HEpeB∥∥∥2 ≤ (PJA + PJP ) (1− ρ2B)σ2J,B [5], [7], and an upper
bound on γ˜B is expressed as
γ˜B ≤ PA|hA,B|
2
(Pmax − PA) (1− ρ2B)σ2J,B
. (24)
Using (24), we obtain the transmission outage probability as follows
Pto =
 |hA,B|2(
Pmax
PA
− 1
)
(1− ρ2B)σ2J,B
≤ 2Rb − 1

= 1− exp
−
(
Pmax
PA
− 1
)
(1− ρ2B)σ2J,B
(
2Rb − 1)
σ2A,B
 . (25)
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Substituting (25) into (12b), we derive the required transmission power at Alice as
PA ≥ Pmax
1− σ2A,B ln(1−δ)
(1−ρ2B)σ2J,B(2Rb−1)
(26)
where 0 < ρB < 1. From (26), we can obtain the minimum required power at Alice as P ∗A =
Pmax
1− σ
2
A,B ln(1−δ)
(1−ρ2B)σ2J,B(2Rb−1)
. Once P ∗A is obtained, we can still use Algorithm 1 to obtain the maximum
secrecy rate R∗s . This is due to the fact that the SOPs for the active and passive eavesdroppers
have the same expressions as (14) and (15), respectively. Also, when ρB = 1, the optimal
parameters, θ∗ and P ∗A, have the same values as in the perfect CSI case. When ρB = 0, the
jammer cannot obtain the instantaneous CSI between the jammer and Bob, which means that
more AN will leak to Bob, and more power is required at Alice to satisfy (12b).
B. Imperfect CSI Between Jammer and The Active Eavesdropper
In practice, the instantaneous CSI between the jammer and the active eavesdropper can also
be imperfect, which we assume to be described as g˜Ea ∼ CN
(
0, σ2J,EaIN
)
. The relationship
between gEa and g˜Ea is given by
gEa = ρEag˜Ea + eEa , 0 ≤ ρEa ≤ 1 (27)
where eEa ∼ CN
(
0,
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
σ2J,EaIN
)
denotes the estimation error for gEa , and ρEa is the
correlation coefficient between g˜Ea and gEa . Since W˜Ea =
(
IN−gBg
H
B
‖gB‖2
)
g˜∗Ea∥∥∥∥(IN−gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
g˜∗Ea
∥∥∥∥ lies in the null
space of gB, g˜Ea does not affect the SNR at Bob. At the same time, the SNR at the kth passive
eavesdropper is expressed as
γ˜Ek =
PA|hA,Ek |2
PJA
∣∣gHEkW˜Ea∣∣2 + PJpN−2gHEkW˜EpW˜HEpgEk (28)
where W˜Ep ∈ CN×(N−2) lies in the null-space of [gB, W˜Ea ]. Since |hA,Ek |2 ∼ Gamma (1, σ2A,Ek),∣∣gHEkW˜Ea∣∣2 ∼ Gamma (1, σ2J,Ek), and gHEkW˜EpW˜HEpgEk ∼ Gamma (N − 2, σ2J,Ek), the
CDF of γ˜Ek has the same expression as (8). Thus, the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers pso2
has the same expression as (15). Though g˜Ea does not change the SNRs at Bob and the passive
eavesdroppers, it affects the SNR at the active eavesdropper. The SOP for the active eavesdropper
is presented in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1: With g˜Ea , the SOP for the active eavesdropper is given by
pso1 =
(
1 + θ
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
α
)N−2
(1 + θα)N−1
×
(
1 +
(1− θ) (1− ρ2Ea)α
N − 2
)2−N
. (29)
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A. When ρEa = 1, Eq. (29) specializes to (14). After
obtaining the expression of pso1 , we quantify the impact of Rs, PA and θ on pso1 in the following
lemma
Lemma 2: With fixed PA, Rs, and θ, pso1 decreases with ρEa , while with fixed PA and θ, pso1
increases with Rs. In addition, with fixed Rs and θ, pso1 increases with PA. With fixed PA and
Rs, when θ2, the positive solution of
∂Pso1
∂θ
= 0, is larger than unity, ∂Pso1
∂θ
< 0. Otherwise, when
θ2 ≤ 1, ∂Pso1∂θ > 0 (0 ≤ θ ≤ θ2) and
∂Pso1
∂θ
< 0 (θ2 ≤ θ ≤ 1).
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix B. Note that when pso1 = ε, we can obtain
θ = ς (Rs, PA), where ς (Rs, PA) is the inverse function of pso1 . Though ς (Rs, PA) can be less
than zero or greater than unity, a reasonable value of θ should lie between zero and unity. Then
according to Lemma 2, to satisfy the constraint pso1 ≤ ε, two cases arise according to (55).
Case 1: Eq. (55) is satisfied, which means that pso1 decreases with θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Then, to
satisfy the requirement of pso1 ≤ ε, the range of θ is
max (0, ς (Rs, PA)) ≤ θ ≤ 1 (30)
where ς (Rs, PA) ≤ 1 is required.
Case 2: Eq. (55) is not satisfied. Then, pso1 ≤ ε is a convex function of θ, where pso1 decreases
with θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ θ2) and increases with θ (θ2 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Thus, if pso1 = ε, there are two solutions
for θ, namely, min (ς (Rs, PA)) and max (ς (Rs, PA)). To satisfy the requirement of pso1 ≤ ε,
the range of θ is
max (0,min (ς (Rs, PA))) ≤ θ ≤ min (1,max (ς (Rs, PA))) . (31)
For fixed Rs and PA, if there is no θ that satisfies (30) or (31), no solution exists for (12a). Thus,
according to Lemma 2, (30), and (31), Algorithm 2 can be used to obtain the maximum secrecy
rate. In Algorithm 2, Rs increases until there is no θ available to satisfy the SOP constraints at
both the active and passive eavesdroppers, or the secrecy rate Rs is greater than the transmission
rate Rb.
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Algorithm 2 Secrecy Rate Rs Maximization With g˜Ea
1: Initialization: N,K, ε, Pmax, Rs ∈ [0, Rb).
2: According to (16), the optimal power allocated to Alice P ∗A can be obtained.
3: Set i = 1, Rs = 0,
4: if (55) is satisfied
if (21) and (30) have no intersecting values, Rs = Rs + ∆,
else break;
else if (55) is not satisfied
if (21) and (31) have no intersecting values, Rs = Rs + ∆,
else break;
5: i = i+ 1, repeat step 4 until that Rs ≥ Rb.
6: Then the maximum secrecy rate R∗s = Rs.
Remark 4: Different from the perfect gEa case in Section III, pso1 can be a convex function
of θ when (55) is not satisfied. This is because under the case of imperfect CSI g˜Ea , the AN
injected towards the passive eavesdroppers leaks to the active eavesdropper. Of course, similar
to the case of perfect gEa , pso1 decreases with θ when N goes to infinity or σ
2
J,Ea
/σ2A,Ea goes
to infinity. In this case, Eq. (55) always holds.
Remark 5: Different from the perfect gEa case in Section III, θ∗ can be equal to zero with
imperfect CSI g˜Ea . The AN injected towards the passive eavesdroppers can leak to the active
eavesdropper due to imperfect CSI g˜Ea . For this case, the SOP constraint ε may be small
and σ2J,Ea is large. In addition, when the SOP for the active eavesdropper is far less than the
SOP constraint ε, the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers determines the secrecy rate and θ∗ =
1/(N − 1), which has no relation with the correlation coefficient ρEa . On the other hand, when
the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers is far less than the SOP constraint ε, the SOP for the
active eavesdropper determines the secrecy rate, and θ∗ = θ2, which has no relationship to the
correlation coefficient ρEa .
V. MULTIPLE ACTIVE EAVESDROPPERS
The proposed jamming scheme can be extended to the multiple active eavesdroppers case when
the number of antennas at the jammer is greater than the number of active eavesdroppers. In the
presence of M active eavesdroppers and N passive eavesdroppers available, it is challenging to
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design the optimal beamforming vector towards the active eavesdroppers. Hence, for the two-fold
zero-forcing scheme, MRT is still used for secrecy transmission. Thus, the beamforming vector
towards the active eavesdropper is VEa =
[
WEa1 , · · ·,WEam , · · ·,WEaM
]
(1 ≤ m ≤M), where
WEam ∈ CN×1 denotes the beamforming vector towards the mth active eavesdroppers, and it is
written as
WEam =
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
g∗Eam∥∥∥(IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2 )g∗Eam∥∥∥ . (32)
For analytical tractability, assume that all the active eavesdroppers have the same statistical
CSI, i.e., σ2J,Eam = σ
2
J,Ea
. Then, the AN power PJA for the active eavesdroppers is equally
allocated to the directions of all active eavesdroppers. In addition, since the AN towards the
m′th active eavesdropper can leak to the mth passive eavesdropper, different from the single
active eavesdropper case, the SNR at the mth active eavesdropper is given by
γEam =
PA
∣∣hA,Eam ∣∣2
PJA
M
∣∣gHEamWEam ∣∣2 + PJAM M∑
m′=1,m′ 6=m
∣∣∣gHEam′WEam ∣∣∣2
(33)
where λ7 , |g
H
Eam
WEam |2
σ2J,Ea/2
∼ χ2(2(N −1)), and λ8 ,
M∑
m′=1,m′ 6=m
∣∣∣∣gHEam′WEam
∣∣∣∣2
σ2J,Ea/2
∼ χ2(2(M −1)).
Then, λ7+λ8 ∼ χ2(2(N +M − 2)). Thus, the ratio λ1/2(λ7+λ8)/(2(N+M−2)) follows an F -distribution
having (2, 2(N +M − 2)) degrees of freedom, which is denoted by F(2,2(N+M−2)), and the CDF
of γEam is given by
FγEam (x) = 1−
(
PAσ
2
A,Ea
PAσ2A,Ea +
PJA
M
σ2J,Eax
)M+N−2
. (34)
According to (34), the secrecy outage probability for the active eavesdroppers is given by
pso1 = 1−
M∏
m=1
FγEam
(
2Rb−Rs − 1) (35)
where selection combining is applied at the active eavesdroppers. In addition, WEp ∈ CN×(N−M−1)
should lie in the null-space of [gB,WEa ]. Similar to the single active eavesdropper case, the AN
for the active eavesdroppers will leak to the passive eavesdroppers. Then, the SNR at the kth
passive eavesdropper is rewritten as
γEk =
PA|hA,Ek |2
PJA
M
M∑
m=1
∣∣gHEkWEam ∣∣2 + PJpN−M−1gHEkWEpWHEpgEk (36)
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where λ9 ,
M∑
m=1
∣∣gHEkWEam ∣∣2 ∼ Gamma(M,σ2J,Ek). λ10 , gHEkWEpWHEpgEkσ2J,Ek/2 ∼
Gamma (N −M − 1, σ2J,Ek). Similar to (8), the CDF of γEk can be rewritten as
FγEk (x) = 1− Pr
(
PA|hA,Ek |2
PJAλ9
M
+
PJpλ10
N−M−1
≥ x
)
=1−
(
1 +
PJAxσ
2
J,Ek
MPAσ2A,Ek
)−M
×
(
1 +
PJpxσ
2
J,Ek
(N −M − 1)PAσ2A,Ek
)1+M−N
(37)
Then, the secrecy outage probability for the passive eavesdroppers is rewritten as
pso2 = 1−
K∏
k=1
FγEk
(
2Rb−Rs − 1). (38)
Substituting (35) and (38) into (12c), the optimal power allocation problem is formulated under
the case of coexisting multiple active eavesdroppers and multiple passive eavesdroppers. The
problem can be solved similar to the single active eavesdropper case. Due to space limitation,
the derivation is omitted here.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed
secure transmission scheme for different system parameters. Without loss of generality, we
assume Rb = 8 bit/s/Hz in this section. The total transmission power Pmax and transmission
power at the active eavesdropper PEa are, respectively, normalized by the noise variance, and
denoted as P¯max and P¯Ea in the following simulations, i.e., P¯max = Pmax/N0 and P¯Ea = PEa/N0.
In addition, γ¯A,B = σ2A,B/N0, γ¯A,Ea = σ
2
A,Ea
/N0, γ¯A,Ek = σ
2
A,Ek
/N0, and γ¯Ea,B = σ2Ea,B/N0
denote the normalized channel quality of Alice → Bob, Alice → Ea, Alice → Ek, and Ea
→ Bob links, respectively. Similarly, γ¯A,B = σ2A,B/N0, γ¯A,Ea = σ2A,Ea/N0, γ¯A,Ek = σ2A,Ek/N0
denote the normalized channel quality of the Jammer → Bob, Jammer → Ea, and Jammer →
Ek links, respectively.
Figure 2 compares the maximum secrecy rate for the proposed scheme and the traditional AN
scheme, where the power Pmax−PA is uniformly allocated to the N − 1 dimensions [10], [11],
[40]. To illustrate the effect of the active eavesdropper, we assume one active eavesdropper and
K passive eavesdroppers in the proposed schemes and only K+1 passive eavesdroppers in the
conventional scheme. In addition, we aasume an equal power allocation scheme with the two-
fold zero forcing beamforming as another benchmark. To compare the three schemes explicitly
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Fig. 2. The maximum secrecy rate against N . K = 1, γ¯A,Ea = 3dB, γ¯J,Ea = 7dB, γ¯A,B = 10dB, δ = 0.1, P¯max = 40dB,
P¯Ea = 10dB, γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and ε = 10
−2.
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Fig. 3. The maximum secrecy rate against γ¯J,Ek . N = 4, K = 3, γ¯A,Ea = 3dB, γ¯A,B = 10dB, δ = 0.1, P¯Ea = 10dB,
γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and P¯max = 40dB.
and fairly, we assume that γ¯A,Ea = γ¯A,Ek and γ¯J,Ea = γ¯J,Ek when the active eavesdropper and the
passive eavesdroppers coexist. In addition, we assume that the SOP in the conventional scheme
is less than ζ = ε2. It can be seen that the achievable maximum secrecy rate for the proposed
scheme is larger than its values for both conventional scheme and equal power allocation scheme.
This shows the superiority of our proposed algorithm. Moreover, the three curves become almost
flat for larger N . This shows that for a given beamforming and power allocation scheme, the
impact of N on secrecy rate is limited when N is large.
The secrecy rate for different values of γ¯J,Ek is illustrated in Fig. 3. It is clear that with different
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Fig. 4. The impact of ρB on secrecy rate. K = 5, γ¯A,Ea = 2dB, γ¯A,Ek = 2dB, γ¯J,B = 2dB, ε = 10
−2, γ¯J,Ek = 10dB,
γ¯A,B = 20dB, δ = 0.1, P¯Ea = 10dB, γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and P¯max = 40dB.
SOP constraints, the secrecy rate for the proposed scheme is still better than its value for the
conventional scheme. Moreover, the gap between the two schemes becomes large when the SOP
constraint decreases. The advantage of the proposed scheme is obvious when the SOP constraint
is more strict. In addition, we can see that the secrecy rate for the four cases approaches Rb
when γ¯J,Ek goes to infinity. This is because when γ¯J,Ek = γ¯J,Ea and both of them parameters
approach infinity, all eavesdroppers in the four curves cannot correctly decode the information,
and the secrecy performance can be guaranteed regardless of the AN power allocation between
the active eavesdropper and the passive eavesdroppers. This corresponds to the extreme scenario
when all the eavesdroppers are close to the jammer and far away from Alice.
The impact of ρB on the secrecy rate is presented in Fig. 4, where the maximum achieved
secrecy rate increases with ρB. A small ρB means that more AN will be leaked to Bob, and
more power is required by Alice to satisfy the transmission quality requirement. As a result, the
power allocated to AN is decreased, the interference at all eavesdroppers is decreased, and the
maximum supported secrecy rate is decreased. In addition, similar to the perfect CSI case, the
secrecy rate increases with N .
The impact of ρB on the optimal power ratio θ∗ is plotted in Fig. 5, where we observe that
θ∗ decreases with γ¯J,Ea , because the SOP for the active eavesdropper decreases with γ¯J,Ea . The
Optimal θ∗ is determined by SOPs for both the active and passive eavesdroppers. In this figure,
the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers is always satisfied. When γ¯J,Ea is large, little power is
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Fig. 5. The optimal power ratio θ∗ for maximum secrecy rate against γ¯J,Ea . N = 6, K = 5, γ¯A,Ea = 10dB, γ¯A,Ek = 2dB,
γ¯J,B = 2dB, γ¯J,Ek = 5dB, γ¯A,B = 20dB, ε = 10
−2, δ = 0.2, P¯Ea = 10dB, γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and P¯max = 30dB.
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Fig. 6. The secrecy rate against γ¯J,Ek . N = 5, K = 3, γ¯A,Ea = 5dB, γ¯A,Ek = 5dB, γ¯J,B = 2dB, γ¯J,Ea = 3dB,
γ¯A,B = 15dB, δ = 0.1, ε = 10−2, PEa = 10dB, γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and P¯max = 35dB.
required by the active eavesdropper to satisfy the SOP constraint and θ∗ decreases. In addition,
θ∗ decreases with ρB because a large ρB means that little power is leaked to Bob and the power
allocated to Alice is decreased. As a result, more power can be allocated to AN and θ∗ decreases.
Moreover, when ρB = 1, θ∗ always decreases with γ¯J,Ea and approaches zero, but can not equal
zero, which coincides with Remark 2.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of ρEa on the secrecy rate for different values of γ¯J,Ek . When
γ¯J,Ek is small, the three curves converge for different values of ρEa , but when γ¯J,Ek is greater
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Fig. 7. The secrecy rate against γ¯J,Ea . N = 5, K = 3, γ¯A,Ea = 10dB, γ¯A,Ek = 5dB, γ¯J,B = 2dB, γ¯J,Ek = 5dB,
γ¯A,B = 15dB, ε = 10−2, δ = 0.1, P¯Ea = 10dB, γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and P¯max = 35dB.
than 6 dB, these three curves begin to separate. When γ¯J,Ek is greater than 15 dB, the three
curves become flat because the secrecy rate is determined by the SOPs for both the active and
passive eavesdroppers. When the active eavesdropper is far away from the jammer, the secrecy
rate is only determined by the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers. Hence, the secrecy rates for
the three different correlation coefficients are the same due to poor channel quality between the
jammer and the passive eavesdropper. On the contrary, the secrecy rate is determined by the
SOP for the active eavesdropper when the channel quality between the jammer and the passive
eavesdroppers is good. In this case, though the AN towards the passive eavesdroppers leaks
to the active eavesdropper, the MRT for the active eavesdropper cannot be guaranteed due to
imperfect g˜Ea . Hence, the secrecy rate increases with ρEa at large γ¯J,Ek . These results support
Lemma 2.
The secrecy rate for different values of γ¯J,Ea is plotted in Fig. 7. Different from Fig. 6, when
σ2J,Ea is small, the secrecy rate increases with ρEa , but the three curves converge when γ¯J,Ea is
larger than 8 dB. The reason for this behavior is similar to Fig. 6. Since for large γ¯J,Ea , ρEa
has no relationship with the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers and the secrecy rate is only
determined by the SOP for the passive eavesdropper, the three curves have the same maximum
secrecy rate. By contrast, when γ¯J,Ea is small, the SOP for the active eavesdropper determines
the maximum secrecy rate.
The optimal θ∗ is plotted against γ¯J,Ek in Fig. 8. When γ¯J,Ek is small, the optimal θ
∗ for
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Fig. 8. Optimal θ∗ against γ¯J,Ek . N = 5, K = 4, γ¯A,Ea = 3dB, γ¯A,Ek = 5dB, γ¯J,B = 2dB, γ¯J,Ea = 3dB, γ¯A,B = 15dB,
ε = 10−2, δ = 0.1, P¯Ea = 10dB, γ¯Ea,B = 3dB, and P¯max = 35dB.
different ρEa have the same value of 1/(N − 1) = 0.25. As in this case, the SOP for the active
eavesdropper is always less than that for the passive eavesdroppers. As a result, the maximum
secrecy rate is determined by the SOP for the passive eavesdroppers, and the optimal θ∗ for the
maximum secrecy rate is 1/(N − 1). In addition, θ∗ increases with γ¯J,Ek because in this γ¯J,Ek
range, the optimal θ∗ satisfies the SOP constraints for both the active and passive eavesdroppers.
On the one hand, when γ¯J,Ek goes to infinity and ρEa 6= 1, we can see that the optimal θ∗
becomes flat. In this case, the maximum secrecy rate is determined by the SOP for the active
eavesdropper, and the optimal θ∗ is the optimal solution of SOP for the active eavesdropper.
Note that there are sudden changes in the curves for ρEa = 0.6 and ρEa = 0.8, which implies
that with the increase of γ¯J,Ek , the maximum achieved secrecy rate is dominated by the SOP of
the active eavesdropper. On the other hand, when γ¯J,Ek goes to infinity and ρEa = 1, the optimal
θ∗ approaches unity but cannot equal unity. In this case, the maximum secrecy rate is determined
by the SOP for the active eavesdropper, which is a monotonous decreasing function of θ. As a
result, θ∗ approaches unity. These results agree with Remark 2 and Remark 4 in Section IV.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a two-fold zero-forcing jamming and beamforming scheme for secrecy transmis-
sion in the presence of both active and passive eavesdroppers. By taking the instantaneous CSI
between the jammer and the active eavesdropper into account, the proposed scheme can achieve
better secrecy performance than the conventional AN scheme with beamforming and can be
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adopted in practice with low complexity. In addition, imperfect CSI between the jammer and the
legitimate receiver will do more harm to the achievable secrecy rate than imperfect CSI between
the jammer and the active eavesdropper. Moreover, we generalized the proposed scheme to the
multiple active eavesdroppers case when there is enough number of antennas at the jammer.
APPENDIX A
SOP FOR ACTIVE EAVESDROPPER WITH IMPERFECT CSI g˜Ea
Due to imperfect CSI g˜Ea , the SNR at the active eavesdropper is written as
γ˜Ea =
PA|hA,Ea |2
PJA
∣∣∣W˜HEagEa ∣∣∣2 + PJpN−2 ∥∥∥W˜HEpgEa∥∥∥ (39)
where W˜HEa =
g˜HEa
(
IN−gBg
H
B
‖gB‖2
)H
∥∥∥∥(IN−gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
g˜∗Ea
∥∥∥∥ . Since
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
is an idempotent matrix,(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)H
=
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
and
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
=
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)2
. Thus, W˜HEag˜Ea can
be rewritten as [41]–[43]
W˜HEag˜Ea =
g˜HEa
(
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)H (
IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
∥∥∥(IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2 ) g˜Ea∥∥∥ g˜Ea
=
∥∥∥∥(IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2
)
g˜Ea
∥∥∥∥ . (40)
Substituting (40) into (39), we can rewrite the SNR at the active eavesdropper as
γ˜Ea =
PA|hA,Ea |2
PJA
∣∣∣ρEaz + W˜HEaeEa∣∣∣2 + PJpN−2∥∥∥W˜HEpeEa∥∥∥2 (41)
where z =
∥∥∥(IN − gBgHB‖gB‖2 ) g˜Ea∥∥∥. In (41), conditioned on z, then ρEaz + W˜HEaeEa follows
CN
(
ρEaz,
(1−ρ2Ea)σ2J,Ea
2
)
. When ρEa = 0, for ‖W˜HEa‖ = 1,
∣∣∣ρEaz + W˜HEaeEa∣∣∣2 follows an
exponential distribution, exp
(
σ2J,Ea
)
. The MGF of
∣∣∣ρEaz + W˜HEaeEa∣∣∣2 is given by
φλ5 (s) =
1
1 + sσ2J,Ea
. (42)
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By contrast, when ρEa 6= 0, λ5 =
∣∣∣ρEaz + W˜HEaeEa∣∣∣2 follows a non-central chi-square distribution
having two degrees of freedom. The conditional MGF of
∣∣∣ρEaz + W˜HEaeEa∣∣∣2 is given by [38],
[44]
φλ5|z (s |z ) =
1
1 + s
((
1− ρ2Ea
)
σ2J,Ea
)
× exp
(
−sρ2Eaz2
1 + s
((
1− ρ2Ea
)
σ2J,Ea
)) . (43)
Note that z2 follows a central chi-square distribution having 2(N − 1) degrees of freedom, and
the MGF of z2 is E (−z2s) =
(
1
1+σ2J,Eas
)N−1
. Integrating (43) w.r.t. z, we obtain the MGF of
λ5 as
φλ5 (s) = E
(
φλ5|z (s |z )
)
=
(
1 +
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
σ2J,Eas
)N−2
(1 + σ2J,Eas)
N−1 . (44)
Since λ6 =
2
∥∥∥W˜HEpeEa∥∥∥2
(1−ρ2Ea)σ2J,Ea
follows a central chi-square distribution χ2 (2 (N − 2)), the MGF of
λ6 is given by
φλ6 (s) =
(
1
1 + s
)N−2
. (45)
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According to (41), (42), (44), and (45), the CDF of γ˜Ea is calculated as
Fγ˜Ea (y) = Pr (γEa ≤ y)
= 1− E
exp
−PJAλ5 + PJP (1−ρ2Ea)σ2J,Eaλ62(N−2)
PAσ2A,Ea

= 1− E
(
exp
(
− PJAyλ5
PAσ2A,Ea
))
× E
(
exp
(
−PJP
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
σ2J,Eayλ6
2PAσ2A,Ea (N − 2)
))
= 1− φλ5
(
PJAy
PAσ2A,Ea
)
φλ6
(
PJ p
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
σ2J,Eay
2PAσ2A,Ea (N − 2)
)
= 1−
(
1 +
PJA(1−ρ2Ea)σ2J,Eay
PAσ2A,Ea
)N−2
(
1 +
PJAσ
2
J,Eay
PAσ2A,Ea
)N−1
×
(
1 +
PJP
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
yσ2J,Ea
PAσ2A,Ea (N − 2)
)(2−N)
. (46)
In addition, the SOP for the active eavesdropper is given by
pso1 = 1− Fγ˜Ea
(
2Rb−Rs − 1) . (47)
Substituting (46) into (47), we can obtain the exact expression of pso1 in (29).
APPENDIX B
IMPACT OF ρEa , Rs, PA, AND θ ON pso1 WITH IMPERFECT CSI g˜Ea
According to (29), the derivative of pso1 w.r.t. ρEa is given by
∂pso1
∂ρEa
= −2ρEaθα
(
N − 1 + (1− ρ2Ea)α)
(1 + θα)N−1
× (N − 2)
N−2(1 + θ (1− ρ2Ea)α)N−3(
N − 2 + (1− θ) (1− ρ2Ea)α)N−1 . (48)
We find from (48) that ∂Pso1
∂ρEa
< 0, which means that Pso1 decreases with ρEa . Similarly, we
can verify that the derivative of pso1 w.r.t. PA,
∂pso1
∂PA
> 0, and the derivative of pso1 w.r.t. Rs,
∂pso1
∂Rs
> 0. In addition, the derivative of pso1 w.r.t. θ can be written as
∂pso1
∂θ
= A (θ) J (θ) (49)
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where
A (θ) =
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
α2
(
1 + θ
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
α
)N−3
(1 + θα)N
×
(
1 +
(1− θ) (1− ρ2Ea)α
N − 2
)1−N
(50)
and
J (θ) = θ2
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
α
N − 1
N − 2 + θ
(
N − 1− (1− ρ2Ea)α
N − 2
)
− (N − 1) ρ
2
Ea(
1− ρ2Ea
)
α
− N − 1
N − 2 +
(
1− ρ2Ea
)
. (51)
Hence A (θ) > 0 and J (θ) determines whether ∂Pso1
∂θ
is greater than zero or not. Fortunately,
J (θ) is a quadratic polynomial in θ. Therefore, the minimum value of J (θ) is given by
min (J (θ)) = −
(
(N−1)ρ2Ea
1−ρ2Ea
+ α
(
ρ2Ea +
1
N−2
))
α
−
(N − 1)
(
1− (1−ρ
2
Ea)α
N−1
)2
4 (N − 2) (1− ρ2Ea)α . (52)
It is clear that min (J (θ)) < 0. When θ = − 1
2α(1−ρ2Ea)
+ 1
2(N−1) , min (J (θ)) is also less than
unity. In addition, when J (θ) = 0, we have
θ1 =
1
2Λ (N − 1) (− (1− Λ)
−
√
(1− Λ)2 + 4 ((N − 2) ρ2Ea (1 + Λ) + (N − 1)2))
<
1
2Λ (N − 1) (− (1− Λ)− |1− Λ|) , (53)
and
θ2 =
1
2Λ (N − 1) (− (1− Λ)
+
√
(1− Λ)2 + 4 ((N − 2) ρ2Ea (1 + Λ) + (N − 1)2)) (54)
where Λ = (
1−ρ2Ea)α
N−1 . It is clear that θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 0. Next, we will examine the range of θ2.
If θ2 > 1, we have
2Λ + 4 (N − 2) ρ2Ea (1 + Λ) + 4 (N − 1)2 − 3 > 0. (55)
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Since θ1 < 0 and the optimum solution of J (θ) is less than unity, J (θ) < 0 (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1) when
(55) is satisfied. Otherwise, 0 < θ2 < 1. In this case, J (θ) > 0 (θ2 ≤ θ ≤ 1) and J (θ) <
0 (0 ≤ θ ≤ θ2). According to the analysis above, Lemma 2 is obtained.
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